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I. INTRODUCTION
The prudent practitioner will note a number of changes, some of them
quite substantial, to Florida's professional responsibility landscape in 1996.1
Courts and ethics committees rendered decisions affecting obligations that
Florida lawyers assume as they interact with prospective clients, clients,
judges, other lawyers, nonlawyer assistants, third parties, and disciplinary
authorities. This article examines significant cases and ethics opinions in the
* Florida Bar Ethics Director. B.S., Florida State University, 1977; J.D., University of
Texas at Austin, 1984; M.L.S., Florida State University, 1996. The author gratefully
acknowledges the valuable research assistance of Kelly J. Wright.
1. This article surveys professional responsibility developments in Florida from July 15,
1995, through July 14, 1996.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2847271 
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context of the different roles which lawyers assume during the course of
their relationships with these individuals and entities.2
Part II explores the traditional role of the lawyer as a zealous advocate
for the client. This section reviews developments of the past year as they
relate to: 1) formation of a lawyer-client relationship; 2) conflicts of interest
and other grounds for a lawyer's disqualification from a matter; 3) restric-
tions on a lawyer's ability to communicate with represented parties; 4) trial
conduct, including the permissible scope of argument; and 5) proper termi-
nation of a lawyer-client relationship. Part III addresses the lawyer's role as
fiduciary, especially with regard to safekeeping of client property. Part IV
looks at decisions affecting the lawyer's role as an officer of the court. Part
V explores various aspects of a lawyer's role as a businessperson. Included
in this section are developments concerning attorney's fees, organization and
operation 6f law firms, a lawyer's relationship with nonlawyers who assist
the lawyer in the practice of law, and law firm marketing activities. Finally,
Part VI considers the lawyer's role as a member of The Florida Bar, and
surveys disciplinary actions taken against Florida lawyers for widely varying
conduct.
3
II. THE LAWYER AS AN ADVOCATE
Probably the most important role played by a lawyer in our adversary
system of justice is that of an advocate who diligently4 and competently, S-
in a word zealously 6-- advances the client's cause. Because of the many
roles and responsibilities of a lawyer, there are limits placed on the extent of
2. Cases and ethics opinions are discussed in the section to which they have the most
significant connection, rather than in every section where they might apply.
3. Important disciplinary cases are analyzed where appropriate throughout the article, but
most are collected in Part VI for the convenience of the reader.
4. FLA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (hereinafter "RPC") Rule 4-1.3 provides: "A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." RPC 4-
1.3 (1987). The RPC are found in chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.
5. Rule 4-1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation." RPC 4-1.1 (1987).
6. Canon 7 of the former Florida Code of Professional Responsibility ("CPR") provided
that a lawyer "is to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." Effective
January 1, 1987, the CPR was superseded by the current RPC. See Florida Bar re Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977 (Fla.), opinion corrected by 507 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.
1986). The RPC mention "zealous" advocacy only in the Preamble.
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a lawyer's advocacy.7 Sometimes it is difficult to discern the exact point at
which one crosses from proper and zealous advocacy, to unethical and over-
zealous, advocacy. The Supreme Court of Florida had no such difficulty
deciding this issue in Florida Bar v. Charnock. There a lawyer represented
a Dutch client who owned real property in Florida.9 A $3,000 mechanic's
lien was filed against one of the client's parcels, which was valued at over
$100,000.0 The lien holder brought a foreclosure action against the prop-
erty, but neither the lawyer nor his client were aware of this action because
service was effected using the "long arm statute."" Judgment was rendered
for the lien holder and the property was auctioned at judicial sale. 12 When
the lawyer inadvertently learned of this, he filed several motions in an
attempt to have the sale set aside. 13 The court denied the motions and issued
a writ of possession.'
4
Refusing to give up, the lawyer hastily procured a tenant for the
property through an oral agreement.15 He then had the tenant complete an
affidavit averring that the tenant was entitled to have possession of the
property, despite the fact that the "tenant" never took possession of the
property.' 6 The lawyer did this in an effort to take advantage of the protec-
tions afforded tenants under Rule 1.580 of the Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure.'7 The supreme court viewed the lawyer's delaying tactics as an
7. For example, one of the most obvious limits on zealous advocacy is the prohibition
against knowingly using false evidence. Included in this prohibition is perjured testimony,
even when such evidence would be extremely helpful to the client's case. See RPC 4-3.3(a)
(1987).
8. 661 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1995).
9. Id. at 1207.
10. Id. at 1210.
11. Id. at 1208. See also FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1991). This section is entitled "Service
on nonresident engaging in business in state."
12. Charnock, 661 So. 2d at 1208.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1210.
15. lML at 1208.
16. Id.
17. Charnock, 661 So. 2d at 1208. The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide, in
relevant part:
Third Party Claims. If a person other than the party against whom the writ of
possession is issued is in possession of the property, that person may retain pos-
session of the property by filing with the sheriff an affidavit that the person is en-
titled to possession of the property, specifying the nature of the claim. There-
upon the sheriff shall desist from enforcing the writ and shall serve a copy of the
affidavit on the party causing issuance of the writ of possession. The party
causing issuance of the writ may apply to the court for an order directing the
1996]
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unethical "fraud on the court in an effort to frustrate the transfer of posses-
sion of the property" and found that they "went beyond the boundaries of
zealous advocacy."18 The court suspended the lawyer from the practice of
law for thirty days.
19
A. Conflicts of Interest and Disqualification
Although disputes in both the disciplinary and disqualification arenas
can turn on the nature of the lawyer's conduct, quite often the determining
factor is whether a lawyer-client relationship existed between the lawyer and
the allegedly aggrieved party. This issue can be crucial, especially where the
facts are otherwise uncontested. For example, in Florida Bar v. King20 the
lawyer defended himself against charges of neglect by asserting that a
lawyer-client relationship did not exist.21 He based this on the fact that he
was not paid a retainer by the complainant.22 Rejecting this argument, the
supreme court flatly stated that "[a] fee is not necessary to form an attorney-
client relationship. 23
Sometimes actions not taken by a lawyer can lead to the conclusion that
a lawyer-client relationship exists. In Florida Bar v. Flowers,24 a lawyer
who shared office space with a nonlawyer immigration consultant was
disciplined for allowing conditions to exist such that persons consulting with
the nonlawyer "could reasonably expect and believe that they were receiving
legal representation" from the lawyer.25 It appeared that the lawyer made no
effort to distinguish his offices from those of his nonlawyer tenant. This
conclusion was supported by the fact that the sign for the office building
contained the name and telephone number of only the lawyer.26
sheriff to complete execution of the writ. The court shall determine the right of
possession in the property and shall order the sheriff to continue to execute the
writ or shall stay execution of the writ, if appropriate.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.580(b).
18. Charnock, 661 So. 2d at 1209.
19. Id. at 1210.
20. 664 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1995).
21. Id. at 926.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 927 (citing Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494, 500 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
24. 672 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1996).
25. Id. at 528.
26. Id. at 527. Several opinions have been issued for situations where lawyers and non-
lawyers share office space. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-15
(1988); Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 78-14 (1978).
[Vol. 21:231
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The Third District Court of Appeal, in Garner v. Somberg,27 recently
decided a highly relevant case concerning the establishment of the lawyer-
client relationship. This decision will likely result in changes to the proce-
dures lawyers use to screen potential clients. After Gamer's wife was
injured in an auto accident, Garner contacted several lawyers about pursuing
a personal injury action, and eventually retained a South Florida law firm.28
The mother of Garner's injured wife, however, hired attorney Somberg.29
Mr. Somberg then filed a petition to have the wife's competency determined
and to have the mother appointed emergency temporary guardian of the
wife.30 Garner moved to disqualify Somberg, alleging that he had previously
communicated with Somberg regarding the personal injury action.3 As a
result of these communications, Garner claimed to have given Somberg
relevant confidential information. 32 Responding to the motion, sole practi-
tioner Somberg asserted that neither he nor anyone in his office had ever
spoken to Garner.33 Garner, however, produced telephone records showing
that he had made three telephone calls to Somberg's office, one lasting
thirteen minutes.34
Faced with these facts, the trial court denied the motion to disqualify,
because Garner failed to demonstrate that he gave confidential information
to Somberg during the calls.35 The appellate court reversed on certiorari
review, ruling that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of
the law.36 Citing the supreme court's decision in State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. K.A. W.,37 the court stated, "[i]n conflict-of-interest
cases, once an attorney-client relationship is shown to have existed, that
relationship gives 'rise to an irrefutable presumption that confidences were
disclosed during that relationship ....,38 This statement of law is correct,
provided an attorney-client relationship has been shown. The problem in
this case was that the court simply assumed, without analysis, the existence
27. 672 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1996).
28. Id. at 853.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Garner, 672 So. 2d at 853.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 853-54.
36. Id. at 854.
37. 575 So. 2d 630, 633 (Fla. 1991).
38. Garner, 672 So. 2d at 854.
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of an attorney-client relationship. The court based its decision on telephone
records of three apparently short telephone calls. The court's assumption
should be disturbing to practicing lawyers. Its holding seems to suggest that
anyone who calls a lawyer's office, even if the caller does not speak to a
lawyer, or just listens to music while on hold for thirteen minutes, will later
be able to disqualify that lawyer. This disqualification will be based on the
claim that an attorney-client relationship was formed. Lawyers may be able
to guard against disqualification by establishing and following written office
procedures for initial client contacts. This can be especially important in
areas of law, such as domestic relations, where lawyer-shopping is common.
A model procedure would provide that a prospective client first speaks with
a nonlawyer, which is usually a secretary or receptionist. Generally, this
person takes enough information to run a check for conflicts, but does not
discuss details of the matter that would be considered confidences under the
ethics rules. Only after the new matter has been cleared by the conflicts
check would the lawyer engage in a discussion with the prospective client.
If attorney Somberg had been able to show that he routinely followed this
type of procedure, perhaps disqualification would have been avoided. While
some may consider this type of procedure unduly burdensome, it appears,
after Garner, that practitioners are left with little or no alternative if they
want to avoid being disqualified for a "confidential" conversation that may
or may not have taken place.39
Turning to more typical matters involving conflicts of interest, the
events in Florida Bar v. Sofo4 provide an example of how conflict problems
can arise when a lawyer becomes involved in a business transaction with his
client.41 The lawyer was both a shareholder in, and general counsel for
Micro Environmental, Inc.42 The company was subsequently bought by
another company.43 The lawyer then became general counsel for the buyer."
The buyer later failed to perform as required under the purchase agreement.45
39. Id. Another troubling prospect is the heightened risk of malpractice liability that
lawyers face when it becomes so easy for a would-be client to establish the existence of a
lawyer-client relationship and its attendant legal duties. See, e.g., Blackhawk Tennessee, L.P.
v. Waltemyer, 900 F. Supp. 414 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
40. 673 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1996).
41. Id. at 1. See cases cited infra notes 317 and 322 and accompanying text (providing
other disciplinary cases in which conflicts of interest rules were violated).
42. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 1.
43. 1l
44. l
45. Id.
[Vol. 21:231
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Consequently, Mr. Sofo sent a demand letter to the principals of the buyer,
on the buyer's letterhead, and signed as general counsel.46 After receiving
an unsatisfactory response, the lawyer wrote to the principals purporting to
terminate the purchase agreement.47 The supreme court suspended the
lawyer from practice for ninety-one days, concluding that he violated several
conflict rules. 48 The lawyer's simultaneous representation of buyer and
seller violated Rule 4-7.1(b) of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.49
This conflict infraction "was exacerbated by [the lawyer's] ownership of
stock in both companies.' 50 Also violated were rule 4-1.9(a),51 concerning a
lawyer's duty of loyalty to a former client, as well as rules 4-1.9(b), 52 and 4-
1.8(b),53 regarding a lawyer's duty not to misuse client confidences. 4
46. Id.
47. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 1.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Rule 4-1.7(b)(1) provides:
(b) Duty to Avoid Limitation on Independent Professional Judgment. A
lawyer shall not represent a client if the lawyer's exercise of independent profes-
sional judgment in the representation of that client may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the law-
yer's own interest, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely
affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
RPC 4-1.7(b)(1) (1993).
50. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 2.
51. Rule 4-1.9(a), (b) provides:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in
which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former
client unless the former client consents after consultation; or
(b) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the
former client except as rule 4-1.6 would permit with respect to a client or when
the information has become generally known.
RPC 4-1.9(a)(b) (1993).
52. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 2.
53. Id. Rule 4-1.8 (b) provides:
(b) Using Information to Disadvantage of Client. A lawyer shall not use in-
formation relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client consents after consultation, except as permitted or required by
rule 4-1.6.
RPC 4-1.8(b) (1987).
54. Sofo, 673 So. 2d at 2.
19,961
Nova Law Review
Lane v. Sarfati55 was a case in which a lawyer was disqualified from
representation because he violated the duty of loyalty owed to his former
client. The lawyer met with an individual who was in the theatrical man-
agement business.5 6 The lawyer reviewed the standard form contract used by
the client and provided her with an addendum to be appended to the standard
contract. 57 Sometime later, the lawyer's former client was embroiled in a
suit filed against her by one of her actor clients. 8 The suit involved con-
struction of the former client's contract, including the addendum. 59 The
lawyer attempted to appear as counsel for the actor in the suit.60 The trial
court denied the former client's motion to disqualify the lawyer, but the
appellate court reversed and disqualified the lawyer for breaching rule 4-
1.9.61 The court was of the view that the comment to rule 4-1.9 squarely
addressed the situation presented: "[A] lawyer could not properly seek to
rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the former
client. 62
An interesting issue concerning disqualification of the co-counsel of a
client's former law firm was addressed in Zarco Supply Co. v. Bonnell.
63
Zarco was the latest case to rely on the supreme court's decision in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. K.A. W.64 to decide the question of
standing to raise a lawyer's disqualification motion. 65 In Zarco, Stephen
Bonnell was involved in an automobile accident. 66 As an employee of the
company, he hired a law firm ("Firm I") to pursue a personal injury action
against the employer company for himself and several of his family mem-
bers.67 Firm I later withdrew from representing all of the family members,
55. 676 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
56. Id. at 475.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 476.
59. Id.
60. Lane, 676 So. 2d at 476.
61. Id.; see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
62. Lane, 676 So. 2d at 476 (quoting RPC 4-1.9 (1993)).
63. 658 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
64. 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991).
65. Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 153. See also Kenn Air Corp. v. Gainesville-Alachua County
Regional Airport Auth., 593 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992). In Kenn Air, the
court relied on K.A.W. in ruling that the successor in interest of a lawyer's former corporate
client had standing to raise a motion to disqualify on grounds that the lawyer switched sides in
a substantially related matter. Id. at 1222.
66. Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 152.
67. Id.
[Vol. 21:23 1
Chinaris
except the employee's niece, because the employee decided not to sue the
employer. Later, Firm I joined as co-counsel with Firm II to pursue the
case, with the employer and the employee named as defendants. 69 After the
employer filed a motion to disqualify both firms, the employee was dis-
missed as a party, but expressly consented to Firm I's continued representa-
tion, and use of confidences, in the matter.70  The trial court denied the
disqualification motion.71 Reversing this ruling, the First District Court of
Appeal concluded: 1) that the employer had standing to seek disqualifica-
tion, as a party against whom the confidences could be used; 2) that an unfair
informational disadvantage to the detriment of the employer persisted even
though Firm I's former client (the employee) was no longer a named party,
and thus Firm I was disqualified; and 3) that Firm II was disqualified
because the confidential information possessed by Firm I was imputed to
Firm II as a result of their co-counsel relationship.72 Florida case law now
clearly indicates that real parties in interest, such as insurers,73 successors in
interest,74 and civil litigation co-parties," and not just a lawyer's clients,
have standing to assert conflict issues in motions to disqualify counsel from
a civil suit.
In contrast, standing seems to be more narrowly construed in the
criminal defense context. In Terry v. State,76 one of the many issues raised
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 153.
72. Id. Although the court cited subdivision (b) of RPC 4-1.10 as support for this third
conclusion, it really seemed to be treating the two firms as a single "firm" under subdivision
(a) of the rule. Rule 4-1.10(a) and (b) provide:
(a) Imputed Disqualification of All Lawyers in Firm. While lawyers are as-
sociated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any I of
them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by rule 4-1.7, 4-1.8(c),
4-1.9, or 4-2.2.
(b) Former Clients of Newly Associated Lawyer. When a lawyer becomes
associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the
same or a substantially related matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which
the lawyer was associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired in-
formation protected by rules 4-1.6 and 4-1.9(b) that is material to the matter.
RPC 4-1.10(a), (b) (1987).
73. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1991).
74. See Kenn Air, 593 So. 2d at 1219.
75. See Zarco, 658 So. 2d at 151.
76. 668 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1996).
1996]
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concerned the appellant's claim that he had standing to raise a conflict of
interest on behalf of his co-defendant.77 Noting that the putative conflict was
between the co-defendant and the public defender's office, the Supreme
Court of Florida rejected this claim, stating that "[n]o authority supports
appellant's position that a third party has standing to raise a conflict of
interest argument with regard to a codefendant."
78
Another conflict decision in the criminal law area was Colton v. State,79
which dealt with issues that arose after a lawyer changed employers. The
lawyer was employed in the trial section of the public defender's office
when a defendant was tried and convicted. 80 The lawyer, however, did not
work on the case.81 The lawyer then moved to the criminal appeals division
of the attorney general's office, where he filed an answer brief in the
defendant's appeal.82 Not surprisingly, the defendant moved to disqualify
the lawyer, alleging that the lawyer had access to confidential information.
8 3
The First District Court of Appeal denied the motion to disqualify, stating:
We note that there is no Rule of Professional Conduct which ap-
plies to this fact situation. Rule 4-1.10 applies to lawyers moving
from one firm to another. Rule 4-1.11 covers successive govern-
ment and private employment. There is no rule which specifically
addresses successive government to government employment when
those interests are adverse, as is the case here.
s4
The court reached the correct conclusion, but its statement above is not
entirely correct. Although the rules cited by the court do not directly address
the matter, the comment to rule 4-1.11 specifically notes that rule 4-1.11 is to
77. Id. at 961. Interestingly, the appellant contended that, in multiple defendant capital
cases, it was the policy of the public defender's office to allow the state attorney's office to
determine which of the defendants would be represented by the public defender and which
would be represented by outside conflict counsel. Id. at 961 n.7.
78. Id. at 961. The supreme court expressly rejected appellant's reliance on the comment
to RPC 4-1.7 (1993). "In a criminal case ... [w]here the conflict is such as clearly to call in
question the fair or efficient administration of justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the
question." I&a t 961 n.8.
79. 667 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
80. Id. at 342.
81. 1a
82. Id
83. Id
84. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 342-43.
[Vol. 21:231
Chinaris
govern this type of situation.8 5 The court then concluded that there was no
appearance of impropriety in the situation presented because the defendant
merely alleged access to confidential information, rather than possession of
it.86 The lawyer had never represented the defendant and trial and appellate
representation are of a significantly different nature.87
Reasons other than the usual conflict of interest violations were cited as
grounds for disqualification in the civil arena. In Christensen v. Correa,
88
the Fifth District Court of Appeal appeared to assume the existence of a
fiduciary relationship between a suspended lawyer and a lawyer who was
appointed to act as "inventory attorney" pursuant to rule 1-3.8.89 The
inventory attorney was appointed to inventory the files of the suspended
lawyer, who had misappropriated trust account funds.90 The suspended
lawyer had practiced in a law firm with his brother.91 The brother later sued
a firm client for fees allegedly owed to the firm, and the client engaged the
inventory attorney's law firm as defense counsel.92 Defense counsel asserted
counterclaims of negligence and professional malpractice. 93 The plaintiff
moved to disqualify defense counsel, arguing that a conflict of interest was
present on the grounds that the inventory attorney owed a fiduciary duty to
85. The comment to rule 4-1.11 provides: "When the client is an agency of one govern-
ment, the agency should be treated as a private client for purposes of this rule if the lawyer
thereafter represents an agency of another government, as when a lawyer represents a city and
subsequently is employed by a federal agency." RPC 4-1.11 cmt. (1987)
86. Colton, 667 So. 2d at 343.
87. Id.
88. 673 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
89. Id. at 146. Rule 1-3.8 provides, in part:
(a) Appointment; Grounds; Authority. Whenever an attorney is suspended,
disbarred, becomes a delinquent member, abandons a practice, disappears, or
dies, and no partner, personal representative, or other responsible party capable
of conducting the attorney's affairs is known to exist, the appropriate circuit
court, upon proper proof of the fact, may appoint an attorney or attorneys to in-
ventory the files of the subject attorney and to take such action as seems indi-
cated to protect the interests of clients of the subject attorney, as well as the inter-
est of that attorney.
(b) Maintenance of Attorney-Client Confidences. Any attorney so ap-
pointed shall not disclose any information contained in files so inventories with-
out the consent of the client to whom such file relates except as necessary to
carry out the order of the court that appointed the attorney to make the inventory.
RPC 1-3.8 (a)-(b) (1995).
90. Christensen, 673 So. 2d at 145.
91. Id.
92. ld.
93. Id.
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the suspended attorney.9" The trial court granted the motion and the appel-
late court affirmed per curium.95  A cogent dissent disagreed with the
majority's decision, maintaining that the suspended lawyer was not the
inventory attorney's "client" and thus, there was no conflict of interest.
96
The dissenting judge opined that, although an inventory attorney "is in a
position of trust as to both the suspended attorney and his former clients, the
primary fiduciary duty is owed to the former clients who choose to retain the
inventory attorney since that is an attorney-client relationship."
97
Discovery violations have also resulted in disqualification. In Henri-
quez v. Temple,98 a law firm was disqualified after "one of its attorneys
deliberately and surreptitiously obtained documents ... [that] the trial court
had previously ordered were not to be produced." 99
Finally, over-zealous lawyers who persisted in their attempts to con-
tinue representing clients, even after the entry of disqualification orders,
faced disciplinary problems.' ° In Birdsong, the lawyer was disqualified
from representing a client in a civil case for conflict of interest reasons.' °I
Notwithstanding the court's order, the lawyer continued to assist the client in
that matter behind the scenes by such actions as discussing the case with the
client and preparing pleadings.102  A thirty-day suspension was the end
result. 10 3 In Florida Bar v. Canto,1°4 more egregious misconduct, by a
lawyer who blatantly continued to litigate a case from which he was dis-
qualified several years prior to the disciplinary action, netted the lawyer a
two-year suspension. 15
B. Communication With Represented Opponents
Florida law concerning the permissible scope of a lawyer's contacts
with represented persons continued to develop in 1996. For several years it
has been increasingly difficult to definitively determine whether opposing
94. Id
95. Christensen, 673 So. 2d at 145.
96. Id. at 146 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
97. Christensen, 673 So. 2d at 146.
98. 668 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
99. Id. at 638.
100. Florida Bar v. Birdsong, 661 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1995).
101. Id. at 1200.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1201.
104. 668 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1996).
105. Id. at 584.
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counsel may contact former employees of a represented corporation and, if
so, exactly which former employees are subject to such contact. Rule 4-4.2
precludes a lawyer from contacting someone who is represented by counsel
without that counsel's consent. 1' 6 The rule, however, does not expressly
define exactly who within the corporate structure is considered to be
represented by a corporation's lawvyer.107 The comment to rule 4-4.2 offers
guidance concerning ex parte communication with current officers and
employees, but does not answer the former employee question.'08 In 1989,
the Florida Bar Board of Governors approved an advisory ethics opinion,
which concluded that it was permissible for a lawyer to contact any former
officer or employee of a represented corporation without the consent of the
106. Rule 4-4.2 provides:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another law-
yer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer. Notwith-
standing the foregoing, an attorney may, without such prior consent, communi-
cate with another's client in order to meet the requirements of any statute or con-
tract requiring notice or service of process directly on an adverse party, in which
event the communication shall be strictly restricted to that required by statute or
contract, and a copy shall be provided to the adverse party's attorney.
RPC 4-4.2 (1995).
107. Id.
108. The comment to rule 4-4.2 provides:
This rule does not prohibit communication with a party, or an employee or
agent of a party, concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the
existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or
between two (2) organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from com-
municating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate
matter. Also, parties to a matter may communicate directly with each other and a
lawyer having independent justification for communicating with the other party
is permitted to do so. Communications authorized by law include, for example,
the right of a party to a controversy with a government agency to speak with
government officials about the matter.
In the case of an organization, this rule prohibits communications by a law-
yer for one party concerning the matter in representation with persons having a
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization and with any other person
whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be imputed to the or-
ganization for purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may con-
stitute an admission on the part of the organization. If an agent or employee of
the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the con-
sent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this
rule. Compare rule 4-3.4(f). This rule also covers any person, whether or not a
party to a formal proceeding, who is represented by counsel concerning the mat-
ter in question.
RPC 4-4.2 cmt. (1987).
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corporation's counsel, unless the person contacted was in fact represented by
the corporation's counse.1. 9 Opinion 88-14 cautioned that the communi-
cating lawyer was forbidden to inquire into any attorney-client privileged
matters. 110
Throughout the intervening years, courts have given varying degrees of
acceptance to the reasoning articulated in Opinion 88-14."' While earlier
decisions by both Florida and federal courts tended to question the opinion,
in 1996 the pendulum seemed to swing the other way. The Third District
Court of Appeal heartily endorsed Opinion 88-14 in Reynoso v. Greynolds
Park Manor, Inc.112 Granting plaintiffs petition for a writ of certiorari to
quash a trial court order forbidding plaintiff's counsel from conducting ex
parte interviews of the defendant nursing home's former employees, the
court held that "the proscription of Rule 4-4.2 does not extend to former
corporate employees."" 3  The court relied on both Opinion 88-14 and
American Bar Association Formal Opinion 91-359, and noted that its
decision was in accord with "the great majority of the courts to have consid-
ered this issue."' 1 4 The court certified that its decision was in direct conflict
with a prior second district decision" 5 in hope that the matter would be
finally resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida.16
In another case involving ex parte communication with a nursing
home's former employees, the Fourth District Court of Appeal aligned itself
109. Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 88-14 (1989).
110. Id. Although not mentioned in the opinion, the communicating lawyer "shall not
state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested" and, when appropriate, must take reasonable
efforts to correct any misunderstanding of the lawyer's role. RPC 4-4.3 (1987).
111. See, e.g., Rentclub v. Transamerica Rental Finance Corp., 811 F. Supp. 651 (M.D.
Fla. 1992), aft'd, 43 F.3d 1439 (11th Cir. 1995); Lang v. Reedy Creek Improvement Dist.,
888 F. Supp. 1143 (M.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Florida Cities Water Co., No. 93-281-
CIV-FTM-21, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7507 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 1995); Browning v. AT&T
Paradyne, 838 F. Supp. 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So.
2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc. v. Keiser, 611 So. 2d 1305
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
112. 659 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
113. Id. at 1157.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 158. See Barfuss v. Diversicare Corp. of Am., 656 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1995).
116. Reynoso, 659 So. 2d at 1158. The supreme court's conflict jurisdiction, however,
was never invoked pursuant to Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A) of the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
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with Reynoso and approvingly cited Opinion 88-14.117 The appellate court
held that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in
entering an order prohibiting such contacts and requiring the communicating
attorney to disclose any notes and statements taken as a result of the con-
tacts. 118 The court's decision was also certified by the appellate court as
directly conflicting with the Second District's decision1 19 Thus, the stage is
now set for a supreme court opinion providing guidance in this problematic
area.
Reynoso and Schwartz were not the only Florida cases facing the issue
of contacts with former corporate employees. The First District Court of
Appeal had the chance to squarely address the question, but managed to
avoid doing so. Once again, Boyd v. Pheo, Inc.120 involved contacts with a
nursing home's current and former employees. The trial court's protective
order barred plaintiff's counsel from contacting certain current and former
employees of the defendant nursing home.12 1 While acknowledging the
certiorari jurisdiction that had been granted by the Third District Court of
Appeal to decide the question, the First District Court of Appeal concluded
that the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction was not warranted because the
likelihood of irreparable harm arising from the trial court's order had not
been demonstrated.122 The court reasoned:
[T]he order in this case does not prevent petitioner from en-
gaging in discovery. Rather, it merely precludes her use of
investigative techniques less formal than those called for in
the rules governing discovery. Nothing in the order pre-
cludes petitioner from utilizing common discovery tech-
niques to identify respondents' current and former employ-
ees (as it appears she has already done), and petitioner is not
117. Estate of Schwartz v. H.B.A. Management, Inc., 673 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996).
118. Id at 118.
119. Id at 119.
120. 664 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
121. The order prohibited ex parte contact with "present and former employees who
directly participated in the care of the decedent," but did not bar such contact with "former
employees who did not directly participate in such care." Id. at 295.
122. Id. at 295-96.
1996]
Nova Law Review
precluded from then deposing any witnesses she so identi-
fies.' 23
Failure to honor the proscriptions of rule 4-4.2 can lead to adverse
disciplinary consequences. Many lawyers do not realize that this rule
prohibits them from even copying opposing counsel's client on correspon-
dence directed to opposing counsel.' 24 A lawyer who knowingly communi-
cated with opposing counsel's client in this fashion was suspended from
practice for ten days in Florida Bar v. Nunes. 1
5
C. Trial Conduct
The arena in which a lawyer most vigorously acts as an advocate for the
client is in the courtroom during trial. A number of 1996 authorities ad-
dressed aspects of a lawyer's trial conduct, with particular attention placed
on the proper bounds of jury argument.
Attempting to "judge shop" by hiring co-counsel in order to force a
judge's recusal from the case was disapproved in Robinson v. Boeing Co. 126
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided that, in order to avoid
unnecessary delay in an active case, a federal district court may deny a
litigant's request to hire additional counsel that would likely cause the trial
judge's recusal.127 The court noted that the apparent motivation of the party
to create disqualification of the trial judge may be considered in ruling on
motions to add or substitute counsel.
128
All lawyers know that rule 4-3.1 prohibits the filing of frivolous claims
or defenses. 129 Yet cases citing or discussing this rule are rare, especially
123. Id.
124. The Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee has long considered such conduct to
be improper. See Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 76-21 (1977).
125. 661 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 1995).
126. 79 F.3d 1053, 1056 (11th Cir. 1996). Accord Town Centre of Islamorada, Inc. v.
Overby, 592 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, a party
may not bring an attorney into a case after it has been assigned to a judge, and then move to
disqualify the judge on grounds that the judge has a bias against the attorney.").
127. Robinson, 79 F.3d at 1056.
128. Id. at 1055.
129. Rule 4-3.1 provides:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a pro-
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outside of the disciplinary context. P.T.S. Trading Corp. v. Habie130 con-
cerned a lawyer who, ironically, filed what was determined to be a baseless
abuse of process claim. A husband and wife were engaged in an apparently
rancorous dissolution of marriage case.131  The parties were living in
Guatemala when his wife moved to Florida and began dissolution proceed-
ings. 32 The wife obtained an ex parte injunction freezing assets of a
company allegedly controlled by husband. 33 The dissolution action subse-
quently was settled, and the freeze order was lifted. 34
Despite the husband's failure to honor the settlement agreement, his
counsel filed an abuse of process suit against the wife and all lawyers who
had worked for her in connection with the dissolution matter.'35 The suit
alleged that the freeze order had been improperly secured for the unlawful
purpose of forcing the husband to settle. 36 The trial court granted the wife's
motion for summary judgment. 137  The Fourth District Court of Appeal
affirmed, denouncing the conduct of the husband and his lawyers and
awarding attorney's fees to the wife under section 57.105(1) of the Florida
Statutes.138 The court stated that "this lawsuit is utterly without any basis in
law or fact and was filed in bad faith."'3 9 Quoting rule 4-3.1, the court
ceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the pro-
ceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.
RPC 4-3.1 (1987).
130. 673 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
131. Id. at499.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Habie, 673 So. 2d at 500.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. (applying FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1993)). Section 57.105(1) currently provides:
(1) The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the prevailing
party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party's attorney in any
civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justi-
ciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing
party; provided, however, that the losing party's attorney is not personally re-
sponsible if he or she as acted in good faith, based on the representations of his
or her client. If the court finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable
issue of either law or fact raised by the defense, the court shall also award pre-
judgment interest.
FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
139. Habie, 673 So. 2d at 499.
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concluded its opinion by calling the lawyer's actions to the attention of The
Florida Bar. 140
The use of improper jury arguments was addressed in a number of
appellate decisions, with trial court judgments being reversed in several
cases. The improper arguments ordinarily violate rule 4-3.4(e), 141 but
whether reversal is required depends on a variety of factors, including: 1)
the severity of the offending remarks; 2) whether objections were made by
opposing counsel; and 3) the law of the district in which the remarks
occurred.
In Muhammad v. Toys "R" Us, 42 the First District Court of Appeal
determined that defense counsel's argument violated RPC 4-3.4(e) where
counsel: 1) suggested that plaintiff may have already settled with a non-
party; 2) gave personal opinions regarding evidence and damages sought; 3)
suggested that plaintiff's expert did not testify at trial because his deposition
testimony was "ludicrous;" and 4) in attacking plaintiff's credibility, related
a personal story about a family incident. 43 Despite the fact that the trial
court had sustained some of plaintiff's objections and issued curative
instruction, a new trial was ordered since "the collective import of counsel's
personal injections, and irrelevant and inflammatory remarks, was so
extensive as to have prejudicially pervaded the entire trial .... 144 This case
is noteworthy because the first district urged trial courts to police these
matters closely in order to avoid having judgments reversed and to curtail
"unseemly conduct that lowers the professional reputation of the Bar and
brings disrepute to our judicial system .... 145
Baptist Hospital v. Rawson'46 was another reversal by the First District
Court of Appeal. The improper arguments in this case so affected the
fairness of the proceeding that a new trial was required even in the absence
140. Id. at 500.
141. Rule 4-3.4(e) provides that a lawyer shall not:
(e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe
is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a per-
sonal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpa-
bility of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused.
RPC 4-3.4(e) (1993).
142. 668 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
143. Id. at 258.
144. Id. at 259.
145. Id. at259 n.1.
146. 674 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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of objections by defense counsel. 47 Comments by plaintiff's counsel
concerning: 1) his personal views of the defendant hospital's actions 148 and
the validity of its legal defenses; 149 2) his perception of the jury's mission; 150
and 3) his personal reaction to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, s l were
deemed to violate rule 4-3.4(e). 5 2
The Fourth District Court of Appeal also reversed a case due to im-
proper argument despite the lack of objections. In Norman v. Gloria
Farms,153 the court concluded that the offending remarks constituted funda-
mental error because of "the nature of the remarks, their collective import
and their pervasiveness throughout closing argument .... ,,154 Defense
counsel repeatedly made statements that the court believed improperly
appealed to the "passions and prejudices of this jury on the critical issues of
liability and financial responsibility."' 15  Counsel "went far beyond the
traditionally impermissible golden rule arguments" by urging the jury to act,
in effect, as "the conscience of the community."'5 6 Specifically, the argu-
ments appealed to the prejudices and self-interest of the jurors by imploring
them to make their decision based on how it would affect them personally
and others in their community. 5 7 These arguments, in the court's opinion,
went beyond the mere violation of rule 4-3.4(e) due to "their potential
impact on the integrity of the fact-finding process .... Norman is useful
for two reasons. First, it describes the fourth district's view on the issue of
whether arguments that are improper, but not objected to, can be the basis of
a reversal. Second, the opinion reviews the positions taken on this issue by
other district courts.159
147. Id. at 779.
148. Plaintiffs counsel stated that the defendant's decision not to take the injured plain-
tiff to the hospital emergency room "was the most ridiculous decision that anybody has ever
made in history." Id. at 778.
149. Comments included statements that the hospital's defenses were "unbelievable" and
"insulting." Id. at 779.
150. "If ydu let them get away with irresponsible medicine, then you breed irresponsible
medicine." Id.
151. Counsel stated that he woke up with nightmares after viewing his client's day-in-the-
life video. Rawson, 674 So. 2d at 779.
152. Id.
153. 668 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
154. Id. at 1024.
155. Id. at 1021.
156. 1l
157. Id.
158. Norman, 668 So. 2d at 1024.
159. Id. at 1023 n.7.
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The scope of Norman was explained by the concurring opinion in
another Fourth District Court of Appeal case, Donahue v. FPA Corp.16 In
Donahue, defense counsel referred to matters not in evidence and offered a
personal attack on the credibility of plaintiffs expert.' 6' No objections,
however, were made regarding these comments.1 62 The concurring opinion
stated that these remarks violated rule 4-3.4(e), but viewed Norman as
requiring reversal only in extreme cases.163 Accordingly, the opinion warned
lawyers practicing in the fourth district that "if counsel intend to appeal to
this court, they would be well-advised to object" to improper argument at
trial."6
A similar result was reached by the First District Court of Appeal in
Rockman v. Barnes. 65 At trial, plaintiffs counsel violated rule 4-3.4(e) by
expressing his personal beliefs concerning the evidence presented.
66
Defense counsel objected, the objections were sustained, and the judge
issued curative instructions.' 67 Nevertheless, on appeal the defendant argued
that reversal of the judgment in favor of plaintiff was warranted because the
improper arguments constituted reversible error. 68 While noting that it
"definitely [did] not condone the injection of the personal opinion of
plaintiff's counsel into argument before the jury[,]" the appellate court
believed that a "fair trial was conducted despite the improprieties of coun-
sel" and declined to reverse the judgment. 69 As in Norman, one judge
concurred specially to state his view that precedent in the first district did
not require reversal merely because arguments violated rule 4-3.4(e), but that
the determinative question was whether "the conduct was so egregious as to
affect the fairness of [the] proceedings."'' 70
Yet another judge, this time from the Second District Court of Appeal,
concurred specially to comment on the proper standards to be used by
appellate courts in determining whether improper arguments warrant the
160. 677 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (Klein, J., concurring specially).
161. Id. at 883.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 884.
164. Id.
165. 672 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
166. Id. at 891.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Rockman, 672 So. 2d at 892 (Wolf, J., concurring specially).
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granting of a new trial. In D'Auria v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 7 1 the concur-
ring judge expressed the opinion that defense counsel's remarks to the jury
violated rule 4-3.4(e). 172 The remarks in question included the injection of
counsel's personal opinions, appeals to the jurors as the community's
conscience, and "character assassinations" on the plaintiff, her counsel, and
her witnesses. 73 No objections or motions for mistrial, however, were
lodged by plaintiffs counsel and the appellate court affirmed the judg-
ment. 74 The concurring opinion cites approvingly to another second district
decision, Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida.175 Hagan contains a detailed
analysis of the relationship between improper argument and reversible error
that will be useful to both attorneys and judges in the second district. 176
The Third District Court of Appeal found a debatable argument to be
permissible in Forman v. Wallshein. 7 In this case, the court decided that, in
a closing argument in a civil case, it was not improper argument for counsel
to call opposing party a "liar" where there was a basis in the evidence to do
so.'78 Additionally, the court noted that using the phrase "I think" or "I
believe" in closing argument does not always constitute a prohibited expres-
sion of personal opinion. 179 Such phraseology is permissible where it is
evident from the context that counsel is merely employing a figure of
speech.18
0
Interestingly, although a significant number of appellate opinions
condemned improper jury arguments as an ethical infraction, only one
reported disciplinary case dealt with this issue.'8 ' In Kelner, a lawyer
violated both rule 4-3.4(e) and the court's order by repeatedly referring in
trial to matters that he did not reasonably believe to be relevant or supported
by admissible evidence. 182 The lawyer's improper argument resulted in a
171. 673 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
172. Id. at 147 (Antoon, J., concurring specially).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 147-48 (referring to Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, 666 So. 2d 580 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
176. Hagan, 666 So. 2d at 587. Although the court in Hagan indicated that the argu-
ments in question there were unprofessional, it made no statements regarding whether they
violated the RPC. IaL
177. 671 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
178. Id. at 874.
179. Id. at 875.
180. Id.
181. Florida Bar v. Kelner, 670 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 1996).
182. Id. at 63.
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mistrial. 83 The supreme court, in publicly reprimanding the lawyer, com-
mented that, while the lawyer "has a duty to zealously represent his client,
this duty does not require that he violate a court order and produce a mis-
trial. , '1
84
D. Termination of Representation
The point at which an attorney-client relationship may or must be
terminated is often not clear to counsel. 85 Nor is it always clear to the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Rule 4-1.16 provides:
(a) When Lawyer Must Decline or Terminate Representation. Except as
stated in subdivision (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where represen-
tation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if:
(1) the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct or law;
(2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the law-
yer's ability to represent the client; or
(3) the lawyer is discharged.
(b) When Withdrawal Is Allowed. Except as stated in subdivision (c), a
lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be accom-
plished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if:
(I) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers re-
pugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fals substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer re-
garding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the
lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on
the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or
(6) other good cause for withdrawal exists.
(c) Compliance With Order of Tribunal. When ordered to do so by a tribu-
nal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for termi-
nating the representation.
(d) Protection of Client's Interest. Upon termination of representation, a
lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interest, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for em-
ployment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client
is entitled, and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned.
The lawyer may retain papers and other property relating to or belonging to the
client to the extent permitted by law.
RPC 4-1.16 (1995).
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courts, when court approval is required.18 6 This uncertainty is exacerbated
when counsel is court-appointed. Roberts v. State187 set forth the Fourth
District Court of Appeal's helpful analysis of how a court should respond to
motions to withdraw. In particular, motions that are filed by court-appointed
criminal defense counsel in various factual circumstances.188 Appointed
counsel in Roberts represented a criminal defendant on several felony
charges.189 A plea agreement was reached after a jury was selected. 90 Just
prior to sentencing, defense counsel moved to withdraw, citing an irretrieva-
bly broken attorney-client relationship.' 9' The motion, however, did not
include a request for a hearing on the withdrawal issue prior to the sentenc-
ing hearing. 92 At the sentencing hearing, the lawyer informed the court that
his client wished to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground that the lawyer
misled or coerced the client into agreeing to the plea bargain. 93 Despite
defense counsel's request that the court grant his withdrawal and appoint a
special public defender to argue the motion to withdraw the plea for the
defendant, the court conducted an inquiry of the defendant regarding the plea
withdrawal issue. 194 It then denied both counsel's motion to withdraw from
the case and defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. 95
On appeal the fourth district reversed, concluding that the trial court
had erred in not hearing, and granting, counsel's motion to withdraw before
moving on to the matter of defendant's motion to withdraw the plea. 96 The
court's opinion pointed out that "[tihere is a spectrum of reasons for a public
defender or court-appointed counsel to file a motion to withdraw, with
differing responses required by the trial courts."197 At one extreme, the trial
court is required to grant a motion to withdraw when a public defender
certifies to the court that the interests of two clients are so adverse or hostile
186. Court approval is required before counsel may withdraw from a case in litigation.
See FLA. R. JUD. ADMiN. 2.060(i).
187. 670 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The fourth district followed its
decision in Martin v. State, 675 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
188. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1044.
189. Id. at 1043.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1043.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1045.
197. d at 1043.
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that the attorney faces an irreconcilable conflict of interest.198 At the other
extreme, the court is not required to permit withdrawal on the basis of a
general loss of confidence by the client in the attorney, standing alone.' 99 In
between these two extremes are the difficult situations where the client
alleges some degree of incompetence on the part of the attorney.
2W
The Roberts court found that an actual conflict of interest was present
because the very basis for the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was the
alleged misconduct of the defense lawyer.20 1 Yet, the trial court's refusal to
permit the lawyer to withdraw from the representation placed the lawyer "in
the impossible position of attempting to argue the motion to withdraw the
plea .... ,,2 This conflict between the personal interests of defense counsel
and his obligations to his client was a violation of rule 4-1.7(b). 203 Thus, the
trial court erred in not permitting counsel to withdraw.
Additionally, as an ethical matter the steps prescribed in rule 4-1.16204
must be followed when terminating representation of a client--even one who
has not paid his or her bill. In Florida Bar v. King,20 5 the Supreme Court of
Florida stated that, "while lawyers are entitled to charge for their services,
they cannot simply abandon a case once they have provided services without
compensation." 2 6 For this and other transgressions, the lawyer was sus-
pended for three years.
207
JI. THE LAWYER AS A FIDUCIARY
Regrettably, each year lawyers are disciplined for violating their
fiduciary duties as holders of funds that belong to others, such as partners,
third parties, and especially clients.20 8 A case that involved several of these
198. Roberts, 670 So. 2d at 1043 (citing Guzman v. State, 644 So. 2d 996, 999 (Fla.
1994)).
199. Id. at 1044 (citing Johnson v. State, 497 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. 1986)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1045.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 49.
204. See supra note 185.
205. 664 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1995). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 924 (citing Atilus v. United States, 406 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir. 1969)).
207. Id.; accord Florida Bar v. Hooper, 509 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1987).
208. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, other cases involving a lawyer's
failure to fulfill his or her fiduciary responsibilities are also addressed in this article. See cases
cited supra p. 234. See also cases cited infra pp. 275-81.
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aspects was Florida Bar v. Benchimo. 2 9 While working for a law firm, the
lawyer diverted client fee payments intended for the firm to his own use.
210
The lawyer's conduct was viewed all the more harshly because of the
circumstances surrounding two affected clients: one client resided in Italy
and was not conversant in English; the other was imprisoned in another
state.211 Disbarment was ordered.212
An interesting civil case in which the nature of a lawyer's trust fund
obligations were discussed is Kenet v. Bailey.213 A lawyer and his law firm
represented a client in litigation and recovered funds, which were deposited
into the firm's trust account pending resolution of related disputes through
arbitration. The litigation concerned a business venture in which the lawyer
and the client, among others, participated. Various agreements and releases
were executed. A few years later, the firm disbursed the trust account funds
to itself without notifying the client. At around the same time, the lawyer
had the client execute another release. When the client learned that the trust
funds had been removed by the firm, he sued the lawyer and the firm.
Raising a rather novel defense, the firm asserted that the language of the
release freed it from all "debts" owed to the client-including the trust
funds. The trial court agreed and rendered summary judgment for the firm.
Completely rejecting this defense, the appellate court reversed the judgment.
The court colorfully stated that "the characterization of a client's funds held
by an attorney in his trust account as constituting a 'debt' is woefully
inadequate, akin to describing Dadeland Mall as a shoe store."214 Citing
Judge Cardozo's famous description of a fiduciary relationship,1 5 the court
went on to note that such a relationship is created when a lawyer receives
trust funds to be used for a client's purposes and that misuse of such funds
"is one of the most serious offenses a lawyer can commit."
216
Some decisions by the Supreme Court of Florida in response to peti-
tions seeking amendments to the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar directly
related to the lawyer's role as fiduciary. In a decision that received little
notice but could affect the way many lawyers handle real estate closings, the
court amended rule 5-1.1(g) to broaden the list of limited-risk trust account
209. 21 Fla. L. Weekly S226 (May 23, 1996).
210. Id. at S226.
211. Id
212. Id. at S227.
213. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D982 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1996).
214. Id. at D983.
215. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
216. Kenet, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D983.
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deposits against which a lawyer may disburse before the funds are actually
collected to include checks written by title agencies authorized to do busi-
ness in Florida.217
In contrast, other supreme court decisions regarding rules received
much greater publicity.218 A petition was filed by fifty Florida Bar members,
who are also members of the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Attorneys, seeking to create a new rule that would impose
specific regulations and restrictions upon Florida lawyers practicing in
"family law matters.' 219 Proposed rule 4-1.18 would have required written
fee agreements and a statement of client's rights, strictly prohibited attorney-
client sexual relations, and addressed several controversial matters such as
nonrefundable retainers and attorney's liens. The supreme court declined to
adopt the proposed rule, citing two reasons. First, the court agreed with the
position taken by the Florida Bar Board of Governors that no justification
was shown to warrant treating family law practitioners differently than other
bar members.220 Second, the court noted that its recent adoption of a rule
governing a lawyer's sexual relationships with clients221 addressed some of
the concerns raised by the petitioners.222
Finally, in Bankers Trust Realty, Inc. v. Kluger2 23 the Third District
Court of Appeal addressed the proper pleading of a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against a lawyer. Affirming the trial court's dismissal for
217. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 658 So. 2d 930,
951 (Fla. 1995). Prior to the amendment to rule 5-1.1(g), a lawyer could disburse against
checks written by licensed title insurance agencies, but not "title agencies."
218. See, e.g., Mark D. Killian, Court Okays New Bar Rules, FLA. B. NEWS, Aug. 15,
1995, at 1; Mark D. Killian, Petition Draws Fire, FLA. B. NEws, Sept. 1, 1995, at 1.
219. Amendment to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar -- Rule 4-1.18, Client-Lawyer
Relationships in Family Law Matters, 662 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1995).
220. 111 at 1247.
221. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 658 So. 2d 930
(Fla. 1995). Subdivision (i) of rule 4-8.4, "Misconduct," provides that a lawyer shall not
"engage in sexual conduct with a client that exploits the lawyer-client relationship." RPC 4-
8.4(i) (1987). Rule 4-8.4 appears to be somewhat less restrictive than proposed rule 4-1.18,
which was rejected by the court. Proposed rule 4-1.18 would have flatly prohibited the
commencement of an attorney-client sexual relationship, while rule 4-8.4(i) seems to permit
attorney-client sexual conduct unless it "exploits" the attorney-client relationship. Addition-
ally, the comment to rule 4-8.4(i) further restricts the reach of the rule: "For purposes of this
subdivision, client means an individual, not a corporate or other nonpersonal entity, and
lawyer refers only to the lawyer(s) engaged in the legal representation and not other members
of the law firm." RPC 4-4.8(i) cmt.
222. Id.
223. 672 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
256 [Vol. 21:231
Chinaris
failure to state a cause of action, the appeal's court held that the specifics of
the alleged breach must be pleaded. It is not sufficient for a plaintiff to
simply allege a legal conclusion such as failure to timely act; rather, the
plaintiff must allege facts showing not only the damages allegedly suffered,
but the causal relationship between the attorney's allegedly deficient acts
and the damages. 24
IV. THE LAWYER AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT
Lawyers are commonly referred to as "officers of the court."5 In our
three-branch system of government, a lawyer is more than just a client's
agent. The Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as case law,7 impose
upon a lawyer obligations to the court (or the "justice system") that some-
times limit-or even conflict with-the lawyer's duties to the client. For
example, in an ex parte proceeding a lawyer must inform the court of all
relevant facts, even when the facts are adverse to the lawyer's client. 2
7
Although the tension between the lawyer's duties to both the client and the
court can create ambiguities regarding a lawyer's proper role in a particular
situation, it is clear that a professionally responsible lawyer simply must
have a sense of the scope of his or her duties as an officer of the court. 2
224. Id. at 898.
225. For example, the very first sentence of the preamble to the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides: "A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." RPC Preamble (1987)
(emphasis added). The preamble mentions this role several other times as well. RPC
Preamble (1987). "A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system, and a public citizen are usually harmonious.... Lawyers are officers of the
court and they are responsible to the judiciary for the propriety of their professional activi-
ties." Id. Additionally, the Comment to rule 4-6.1, which is titled "Pro Bono Public Service,"
states in part: "As an officer of the court, each member of The Florida Bar in good standing
has a professional responsibility to provide pro bono legal service to the poor." RPC 4-6.1
(1995).
226. See, e.g., 84 Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 656 So. 2d 1297, 1300 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that a lawyer has ethical obligation, as an officer of the court, to immediately
raise before a trial court the fundamental issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, after it
becomes apparent, in order to prevent an unnecessary expenditure of precious client and
judicial resources).
227. RPC 4-3.3(d) (1987).
228. Awareness of this role as "officer of the court" becomes even more critical when one
considers the new "professionalism" initiatives that are springing up. See, e.g., Gary
Blankenship, Bar Panel Seeks Okay For a Center for Professionalism, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1,
1996, at 1; Gary Blankenship, Professionalism on Front Burner, FLA. B. NEws, July 15, 1996,
at 1.
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The lawyer appeared to lack this sense in Florida Bar v. Tobin229 and,
consequently, was suspended from practice for forty-five days. The lawyer
represented a company in an action against an insurer. Judgment was
rendered for the company, and the insurer deposited funds into the court
registry in satisfaction of the judgment. Some of the funds were disbursed
pursuant to court order. The lawyer's associate then hand-delivered a
motion to the court requesting release of the remaining funds; the insurer
was not timely noticed. In an ex parte proceeding, the associate represented
to the court that the motion was unopposed. The court granted the motion.
The funds were released and given to the president of the lawyer's corporate
client. Needless to say, when the insurer learned of these actions it immedi-
ately attempted to recover the improperly withdrawn funds. The court
ordered the lawyer and the client to return the funds, but the lawyer never
did so.2 ° In the subsequent disciplinary proceeding, the supreme court
agreed with the referee231 that the lawyer's conduct violated his duty of
candor to the court under rule 4-3.3(d) 232 by not providing the court with all
of the necessary material facts in the ex parte proceeding. 233 The lawyer also
violated rule 4-3.4(c) 234 by disobeying an obligation under the court's
rules.235
A lawyer was disciplined for what amounted to a lack of professional-
ism in Florida Bar v. Uhrig.236 While representing a client in a child support
matter, the lawyer mailed an "insulting and highly unprofessional" 237 five-
page letter to the client's ex-husband. The lawyer acknowledged that the
letter caused the recipient to feel "disparaged, humiliated, offended, disap-
229. 674 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1996).
230. Id. at 128.
231. The Supreme Court of Florida appoints a county or circuit judge to preside as
"referee" over the trial of disciplinary cases. RPC 3-7.6(a) (1987).
232. Rule 4-3.3(d) provides:
Ex Parte Proceedings. In an ex parte proceeding a lawyer shall inform the tribu-
nal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make
an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
RPC 4-3.3(d) (1995).
233. Tobin, 674 So. 2d at 128.
234. Rule 4-3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly disobey an obligation
under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid
obligation exists." RPC 4-3.4(c) (1987).
235. Tobin, 674 So. 2d at 129.
236. 666 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1996).
237. Id. at 887. Among other things, the letter included "an inflammatory simile com-
paring [the recipient]'s opinions to body odor .... Id. at 888.
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pointed, and angry."3 8 Noting that rule 4-8.4(d)239 prohibits lawyers from
knowingly humiliating litigants on any basis, the supreme court publicly
reprimanded the lawyer for violating this rule. Uhrig is especially signifi-
cant because it appears to be the first case in which a lawyer was disciplined
solely for violating the anti-disparagement provisions of RPC 4-8.4 since
their adoption in 19 93 .240
As mentioned above, the lawyer's unique role as an "officer of the
court" arises from our three-branch governmental system. The Supreme
Court of Florida had occasion in TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak24' to explain
the different roles that the judicial branch and the legislative branch play in
our legal system. In upholding the constitutionality of the offer of judgment
statute242 and its attorney's fee provision, the court stated:
Article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution provides this
Court with exclusive authority to adopt rules for practice and pro-
cedure in the courts of this State. The Legislature, on the other
hand, is entrusted with the task of enacting substantive law. In
Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 14 (Fla. 1992), we noted that the
judiciary and legislature must work together to give effect to laws
that combine substantive and procedural provisions in such a man-
ner that neither branch encroaches on the other's constitutional
243powers.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal ventured into an area that has
rarely been mentioned in recent judicial decisions-the common law
doctrines of champerty and maintenance. In Kraft v. Mason,244 the court
238. Id.
239. Rule 4-8.4 (d) provides that a lawyer shall not "'engage in conduct' in connection
with the practice of law 'that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,' including to
knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against
litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel, or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not
limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital
status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, employment, or physical characteristic."
RPC 4-8.4(d) (1987).
240. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 624 So. 2d 720
(Fla. 1993).
241. 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995).
242. FLA. STAT § 768.79 (1987).
243. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d at 611.
244. 668 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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offered modem definitions of these concepts.245 These doctrines are not
terribly relevant to most practitioners, but they may become more so in the
wake of the renewed interest in lawyer advertising and solicitation that has
followed the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc.
246
V. THE LAWYER AS A BUSINESSPERSON
Decisions connected with the business aspects of practicing law were
plentiful during the survey period. Cases, ethics opinions, and rule amend-
ments were handed down in business-related areas such as attorney's fees,
the organization and operation of law firms, a lawyer's relationship with
nonlawyers who might assist the lawyer in the practice of law, and marketing
activities undertaken by lawyers and law firms.
A. Attorneys' Fees
An extremely important decision addressing attorney's fee agreements
in light of public policy was rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis.2 47 Chandris should be a wake-up call for those
Florida lawyers who have not paid sufficient attention to the details of the
rules governing contingent fee contracts and referral fees. The supreme
court has served notice that strict compliance with these rules is required in
order for these agreements to be enforceable.
Chandris was rendered in response to certified questions of law posed
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The federal case concerned a
claim of tortious interference with contracts for legal representation.248 An
injured foreign seaman was treated in a Florida hospital. There he met with
a Florida resident who was licensed to practice law in Massachusetts, but not
in Florida. The seaman signed a contingent fee representation agreement
245. Id. at 682. The court considered the "modem view" of "maintenance" to be "'the act
of one improperly, and for the purpose of stirring up litigation and strife, encouraging others
either to bring [an] action[] or to... [defend a suit] which they have no right to make ... '
Id. at 682 (quoting 9 FLA. JUR. 2D Champerty and Maintenance § 1 (1979)). The court
approved the definition of "champerty" as "a form of maintenance wherein one will carry on a
suit in which he has no subject matter interest at his own expense or will aid in doing so in
consideration of receiving, if successful, some part of the benefits recovered." Id. (citations
omitted). "'[O]fficious intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty."' Id.
246. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
247. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1996).
248. Id. at 181.
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with the Massachusetts attorney. The Massachusetts attorney then contacted
a local Florida law firm, and the seaman subsequently signed a contingent
fee agreement with the Massachusetts attorney and the Florida firm.
Although signed by the seaman and the Massachusetts attorney, this second
fee agreement was not signed by the Florida law firm and was silent as to
any division of fee between the lawyers involved. The seaman ultimately
settled his case directly with the defendants and discharged the Massachu-
setts attorney and the Florida firm, who then sued the defendants for tortious
interference. 249
The supreme court concluded that, by entering into a contingent fee
agreement in Florida with a putative client, an out-of-state lawyer who
resides in Florida, but is not admitted to practice in this state, engages in a
professional activity without proper authority and thus engages in the
unauthorized practice of law as proscribed by Florida Bar v. Savitt. 25
Consequently, the fee contract executed by the Massachusetts attorney was
held to be void as against public policy.251 The second fee contract did
involve a Florida law firm but did not comply with the applicable require-
ments of rule 4-1.5.*52 Regarding this second fee agreement, the court
249. IdM at 181-82.
250. Id. at 184 (citing Florida Bar v. Savitt, 363 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1978)).
251. Id. at 186. The fee contract was not signed by all participating attorneys; it did not
spell out the division of fee between those attorneys; it did not provide that each participating
attorney would have joint legal responsibility for the case and that the attorney should be
available for consultation with the client. Chandris, 668 So. 2d 186.
252. Rule 4-1.5(f) provides:
(f) Contingent Fees. As to contingent fees:
(1) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the
service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by
paragraph (f(3) or by law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and
shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the per-
centage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement,
trial, or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery,
and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee
is calculated. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall pro-
vide the client with a written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if
there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its
determination.
(2) Every lawyer who accepts a retainer or enters into an agreement, ex-
press or implied, for compensation for services rendered or to be rendered in any
action, claim, or proceeding whereby the lawyer's compensation is to be depend-
ent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful prosecution or settle-
ment thereof shall do so only where such fee arrangement is reduced to a written
contract, signed by the client, and by a lawyer for the lawyer or for the law firm
representing the client. No lawyer or firm may participate in the fee without the
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consent of the client in writing. Each participating lawyer or law firm shall sign
the contract with the client and shall agree to assume joint legal responsibility to
the client for the performance of the services in question as if each were partners
of the other lawyer or law firm involved. The client shall be furnished with a
copy of the signed contract and any subsequent notices or consents. All provi-
sions of this rule shall apply to such fee contracts.
(3) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(A) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or sup-
port, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(B) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
(4) A lawyer who enters into an arrangement for, charges, or collects any fee
in an action or claim for personal injury or for property damages or for death or
loss of services resulting from personal injuries based upon tortious conduct of
another, including products liability claims, whereby the compensation is to be
dependent or contingent in whole or in part upon the successful prosecution or
settlement thereof shall do so only under the following requirements:
(A) The contract shall contain the following provisions:
(i) 'The undersigned client has, before signing this contract, received and
read the statement of client's rights and understands each of the rights set forth
therein. The undersigned client has signed the statement and received a signed
copy to refer to while being represented by the undersigned attorney(s)."
(ii) "This contract may be cancelled by written notification to the attorney at
any time within 3 business days of the date the contract was signed, as shown
below, and if cancelled the client shall not be obligated to pay any fees to the at-
torney for the work performed during that time. If the attorney has advanced
funds to others in representation of the client, the attorney is entitled to be reim-
bursed for such amounts as the attorney has reasonably advanced on behalf of the
client."
(B) The contract for representation of a client in a matter set forth in subdi-
vision (f)(4) may provide for a contingent fee arrangement as agreed upon by the
client and the lawyer, except as limited by the following provisions:
(i) Without prior court approval as specified below, any contingent fee that
exceeds the following standards shall be presumed, unless rebutted, to be clearly
excessive:
a. Before the filing of an answer or the demand for appointment of arbitra-
tors or, if no answer is filed or no demand for appointment of arbitrators is made,
the expiration of the time period provided for such action:
1. 33-1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million;
plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2 million.
b. After the filing of an answer or the demand for appointment of arbitrators
or, if no answer is filed or no demand for appointment of arbitrators is made, the
expiration of the time period provided for such action, through the entry of
judgment:
1. 40% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 30% of any portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million;
plus
3. 20% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2 million,
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c. If all defendants admit liability at the time of filing their answers and re-
quest a trial only on damages:
1. 33-1/3% of any recovery up to $1 million; plus
2. 20% of any portion of the recovery between $1 million and $2 million;
plus
3. 15% of any portion of the recovery exceeding $2 million.
d. An additional 5% of any recovery after notice of appeal is filed or post-
judgment relief or action is required for recovery on the judgment.
(ii) If any client is unable to obtain an attorney of the client's choice because
of the limitations set forth in (f)(4)(B)(i), the client may petition the circuit court
for approval of any fee contract between the client and an attorney of the client's
choosing. Such authorization shall be given if the court determines the client has
a complete understanding of the client's rights and the terms of the proposed
contract. The application for authorization of such a contract can be filed as a
separate proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint.
Proceedings thereon may occur before service on the defendant and this aspect of
the file may be sealed. Authorization of such a contract shall not bar subsequent
inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly excessive un-
der subdivisions (a) and (b).
(iii) In cases where the client is to receive a recovery that will be paid to the
client on a future structured or periodic basis, the contingent fee percentage shall
only be calculated on the cost of the structured verdict or settlement or, if the cost
is unknown, on the present money value of the structured verdict or settlement,
whichever is less. If the damages and the fee are to be paid out over the long
term future schedule, then this limitation does not apply. No attorney may sepa-
rately negotiate with the defendant for that attorney's fee in a structured verdict
or settlement where such separate negotiations would place the attorney in a po-
sition of conflict.
(C) Before a lawyer enters into a contingent fee contract for representation
of a client in a matter set forth in this rule, the lawyer shall provide the client with
a copy of the statement of client's rights and shall afford the client a full and
complete opportunity to understand each of the rights as set forth therein. A
copy of the statement, signed by both the client and the lawyer, shall be given to
the client to retain and the lawyer shall keep a copy in the client's file. The
statement shall be retained by the lawyer with the written fee contract and closing
statement under the same conditions and requirements as subdivision (f)(5).
(D) As to lawyers not in the same firm, a division of any fee within subdivi-
sion (0(4) shall be on the following basis:
(i) To the lawyer assuming primary responsibility for the legal services on
behalf of the client, a minimum of 75% of the total fee.
(ii) To the lawyer assuming secondary responsibility for the legal services
on behalf of the client, a maximum of 25% of the total fee. Any fee in excess of
25% shall be presumed to be clearly excessive.
(iii) The 25% limitation shall not apply to those cases in which 2 or more
lawyers or firms accept substantially equal active participation in the providing
of legal services. In such circumstances counsel shall apply for circuit court
authorization of the fee division in excess of 25%, based upon a sworn petition
signed by all counsel that shall disclose in detail those services to be performed.
The application for authorization of such a contract may be filed as a separate
proceeding before suit or simultaneously with the filing of a complaint. Pro-
ceedings thereon may occur before service of process on any party and this as-
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stated: "[W]e hold that a contingent fee contract entered into by a member
of The Florida Bar must comply with the rule governing contingent fees in
order to be enforceable. ' 23 The court clearly declared its intent to adopt a
bright line rule and appeared to reject any kind of "substantial compliance"
standard. The court expressly rejected an existing line of district court of
appeal cases "to the extent they may be read to hold that a contingent fee
contract which does not comply with the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity or the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar is enforceable by an attorney
who claims fees based upon a noncomplying agreement. ' 54 A lawyer whose
pect of the file may be sealed. Authorization of such contract shall not bar sub-
sequent inquiry as to whether the fee actually claimed or charged is clearly ex-
cessive. An application under this subdivision shall contain a certificate showing
service on the client and The Florida Bar. Counsel may proceed with represen-
tation of the client pending court approval.
(iv) The percentages required by this subdivision shall be applicable after
deduction of any fee payable to separate counsel retained especially for appellate
purposes.
(5) In the event there is a recovery, upon the conclusion of the representa-
tion, the lawyer shall prepare a closing statement reflecting an itemization of all
costs and expenses, together with the amount of fee received by each participat-
ing lawyer or law firm. A copy of the closing statement shall be executed by all
participating lawyers, as well as the client, and each shall receive a copy. Each
participating lawyer shall retain a copy of the written fee contract and closing
statement for 6 years after execution of the closing statement. Any contingent fee
contract and closing statement shall be available for inspection at reasonable
times by the client, by any other person upon judicial order, or by the appropriate
disciplinary agency.
RPC 4-1.5 (f) (1995).
Regarding the division of fees between lawyers in different firms (which includes referral
fee situations), rule 4-1.5(g) provides:
(g) Division of Fees Between Lawyers in Different Firms. Subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f)(4)(D), a division of fee between lawyers who are
not in the same firm may be made only if the total fee is reasonable and:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer; or
(2) by written agreement with the client:
(A) each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the representation and
agrees to be available for consultation with the client; and
(B) the agreement fully discloses that a division of fees will be made and the
basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
RPC 4-1.5(g) (1995).
253. Chandris, 668 So. 2d at 185-86.
254. Id. at 185. Cases mentioned in the court's opinion were: Fernandes v. Barrs, 641
So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) and Harvard Farms, Inc. v. National Casualty Co.,
617 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993). Similar cases whose holdings would appear to
be affected by Chandris include Ganson v. Department of Admin., 554 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 566 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1990), and Weaver v.
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contingent fee agreement does not comply with applicable rules is not
completely foreclosed from collecting a fee; in a footnote, the court pointed
out that such a lawyer "would still be entitled to the reasonable value of his
or her services on the basis of quantum meruit."5
The exact parameters of the Chandris decision remain to be determined.
The case undoubtedly will spawn litigation, as clients seek to evade contin-
gent fee obligations to their lawyers and lawyers attempt to avoid payment of
referral fees to one another. In fact, the First District Court of Appeal has
already indicated its uncertainty about the scope of the decision by certifying
to the supreme court the question of whether the rule established in Chandris
gives a private party standing to seek an injunction based on a violation of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.2 6
Another bright line fee rule previously announced by the supreme court
was relied upon by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Kocha & Jones,
P.A. v. Greenwald.27 The appellate court reversed a judgment in favor of a
law firm that had withdrawn from a contingent fee case and subsequently
sued the client for attorney's fees.~ The court followed Faro v. Romani,2s9
which held that a lawyer who withdraws from representation prior to
occurrence of the contingency upon his or own volition forfeits all rights to
compensation (unless the client's conduct made the lawyer's continued
representation either legally impossible or ethically improper).260
Another case that could be relevant to lawyers handling contingent fee
cases was Doremus v. Florida Energy Systems of South Florida, Inc. 261 This
case concerned the responsibility for attorney's fees in a case in which a
client had employed two or more lawyers in succession. When a client
changes lawyers in a contingent fee case, the lawyers involved (i.e., the
successor lawyer and the discharged lawyer(s)) often work out an arrange-
ment whereby they agree on a split of the attorney's fee called for in the
client's contract with the successor lawyer. For example, if the client signed
a forty percent contingent fee agreement in a personal injury case with one
lawyer, then subsequently discharged that lawyer and signed a similar
School Board of Leon County, 624 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
634 So. 2d 629 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 119 (1994).
255. Id. at 186 n.4.
256. See Smith v. Bateman Graham, P.A., 21 Fla. L. Weekly D947, D948 (1st Dist. Ct.
App. Apr. 19, 1996). See discussion infra p. 273.
257. 660 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
258. Il at 1075.
259. 641 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1994).
260. Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
261. 676 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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contract with another lawyer, the two lawyers would agree?62 on an accept-
able division of the forty percent fee amount that, per the contract, was due
the second lawyer. This practice seems to be common, and some attorneys
believe that it is required-especially in cases to which the maximum
contingent fee schedule applies, such as personal injury matters.263
A 1980 First District Court of Appeal case, however, decided that a
discharged attorney's quantum meruit fee in a contingent case is to be paid
from the client's share of recovery, rather than as a portion of the successor
counsel's fee. However, the first district case, Adams v. Fisher,2 4 was
decided prior to the supreme court's imposition of a maximum contingent
fee schedule in 1986.265 The question occasionally raised is whether the
adoption of the fee schedule changes the result reached in Adams. Stated
another way, the question is whether, in adopting the fee schedule, the
supreme court intended to cap the amount that one client would pay in one
case or whether the schedule was intended to limit the amount of fee that one
attorney (perhaps one of several employed in succession) could charge one
client in one case. Although no cases directly address this question, the
decisions in Doremus and other cases 266 indicate that Adams remains
unaffected by the existence of the fee schedule. This means that the client,
rather than the successor counsel, can be called upon to pay any quantum
meruit fee267 owed to a discharged lawyer in a contingent fee case.268
262. Presumably with the client's written consent, as required by rule 4-1.5(g)(5). See
supra note 252 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. 390 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
265. Florida Bar re Amendment to the Code of Professional Responsibility (Contingent
Fees), 494 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 1986).
266. See, e.g., Law Offices of Theodore Goldberg v. Fazio, Dawson, DiSalvo, Cannon,
Abers & Podrecca, 659 So. 2d 1200 (Fla 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Stabinski, Funt & De
Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159, 160 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
267. See Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1982).
268. A successor attorney who enters into a contingent fee agreement at the maximum
allowed rate and concludes the case with a minimum of work, or primarily as a result of
discharged counsel's efforts, could be considered to have acted unethically by charging a
clearly excessive fee in violation of rule 4-1.5(a). This rule provides:
(a) Illegal, Prohibited, or Clearly Excessive Fees. An attorney shall not en-
ter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal, prohibited, or clearly ex-
cessive fee or a fee generated by employment that was obtained through adver-
tising or solicitation not in compliance with the Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar. A fee is clearly excessive when:
(1) after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a reasonable fee for
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A novel argument concerning entitlement to fees was made-and
rejected-in Life Care Centers of America, Inc. v. Chiles.2 69 A law firm
represented a client in a class action against the state on contingent fee basis.
The client withdrew from the class action and received no recovery in that
suit. At about the same time, the client settled a preexisting dispute with the
state. The trial court found that the preexisting dispute was not related to the
class action and that it was not resolved on the strength of the class action,
but nevertheless awarded a quantum meruit to the firm. The firm had argued
that its efforts in the class action led to resolution of the other dispute. The
first district reversed the fee award, ruling that as a matter of law the firm
was entitled to no fee under Rosenberg v. Levin270 because the contingency
(i.e., recovery in the class action initiated by the firm) never occurred. 27'
B. Organization and Operation of Law Firms
The key development in this area was the supreme court's approval of
rule changes that permit Florida lawyers to practice law in the form of a
professional limited liability company or a registered limited liability
partnership.272 These forms now join the professional service corporation as
corporate forms of practice that have been approved by the court.273
services provided to such a degree as to constitute clear overreaching or an un-
conscionable demand by the attorney; or
(2) the fee is sought or secured by the attorney by means of intentional mis-
representation or fraud upon the client, a nonclient party, or any court, as to ei-
ther entitlement to, or amount of, the fee.
RPC 4-1.5(a) (1987).
269. 674 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
270. Rosenberg, 409 So. 2d at 1016.
271. Chiles, 674 So. 2d at 874.
272. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 677 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1996). As
amended, rule 4-8.6 provides:
(a) Authorized business entities. Lawyers may practice law in the form of
professional service corporations, professional limited liability companies, or
registered limited liability partnerships organized or qualified under applicable
law. A professional service corporation, a professional limited liability company,
or a registered limited liability partnership is an authorized business entity under
these rules.
(b) Practice of Law Limited to Members of The Florida Bar. No authorized
business entity may engage in the practice of law in the state of Florida or render
advice under or interpretations of Florida law except through officers, directors,
partners, managers, agents, or employees who are qualified to render legal serv-
ices in this state.
(c) Qualifications of Managers, Directors and Officers. No person shall
serve as a partner, manager, director or executive officer of an authorized busi-
ness entity and engaged in the practice of law in Florida unless such person is le-
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gaily qualified to render legal services in this state. For purposes of this rule the
term "executive officer" shall include the president, vice-president, or any other
officer who performs a policy-making function.
(d) Violation of Statute or Rule. A lawyer who, while acting as a share-
holder, member, officer, director, partner, manager, agent, or employee of an
authorized business entity and engaged in the practice of law in Florida, violates
or sanctions the violation of the authorized business entity statutes or the Rules
Regulating The Florida Bar shall be subject to disciplinary action.
(e) Disqualification of Shareholder, Member, or Partner; Severance of Fi-
nancial Interests. Whenever a shareholder of a professional service corporation,
a member of a professional limited liability company or partner in a registered
limited liability partnership becomes legally disqualified to render legal services
in this state, said shareholder, member, or partner shall sever all employment
with and financial interests in such authorized business entity immediately. For
purposes of this rule the term "legally disqualified" shall not include suspension
from the practice of law for a period of time less than 91 days. Severance of em-
ployment and financial interests required by this rule shall not preclude the
shareholder, member, or partner from receiving compensation based on legal fees
generated for legal services performed during the time when the shareholder,
member, or partner was legally qualified to render legal services in this state.
This provision shall not prohibit employment of a legally disqualified share-
holder, member, or partner in a position that does not render legal service nor
payment to an existing profit sharing or pension plan to the extent permitted in
rule 4-5.4(a)(3), or as required by applicable law.
(f) Cessation of Legal Services. Whenever all shareholders of a professional
service corporation, or all members of a professional limited liability company,
or all partners in a registered limited liability partnership become legally dis-
qualified to render legal services in this state, the authorized business entity shall
cease the rendition of legal services in Florida.
(g) Application of Statutory Provisions. Unless otherwise provided in this
rule, each shareholder, member, or partner of an authorized business entity shall
possess all rights and benefits and shall be subject to all duties applicable to such
shareholder, member, or partner provided by the statutes pursuant to which the
authorized business entity was organized or qualified.
RPC 4-8.6 (1987).
Rule 4-5.4(e) was amended to conform with the changes to rule 4-8.6 and currently pro-
vides:
(e) Nonlawyer Ownership of Authorized Business Entity. A lawyer shall
not practice with or in the form of a business entity authorized to practice law for
a profit if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary represen-
tative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer for a
reasonable time during administration; or
(2) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment
of a lawyer.
RPC 4-5.4(e) (1987).
273. See In re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
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C. Lawyer's Relationship With Nonlawyer Personnel
Several cases explored the permissible parameters of the relationship
that a lawyer has with nonlawyers who may assist or participate with the
lawyer in the practice of law. In State v. Foster,274 a criminal law case
concerning the unlicensed practice of law, the First District Court of Appeal
emphasized that a nonlawyer may not, on behalf of another person, question
witnesses in depositions even under the immediate guidance and supervision
of a licensed attorney. The only exceptions to this broad prohibition are
"those instances in which the Supreme Court of Florida has expressly
authorized nonlawyers to engage in practice under the immediate supervi-
sion of a licensed attorney," such as the law school third-year practice
program.2 5
In Florida Bar v. Beach, a lawyer was disciplined because his
working relationship with a paralegal firm overstepped permissible bounds.
The lawyer purported to act as the paralegals' "supervising attorney" on an
independent contractor basis. The lawyer discussed the legal needs of the
paralegal firm's customers with the firm, reviewed documents prepared by
the paralegal firm for its customers, and offered thirty minute consultations
with those customers. The lawyer was paid seventy-five dollars per case by
the paralegal firm.277
One of the firm's customers complained to the bar about services that
the paralegal rendered to her as a direct result of the lawyer's advice. The
supreme court suspended the lawyer from practice for ninety days for
violating two Rules of Professional Conduct. First, the lawyer assisted
nonlawyers in the unlicensed practice of law. 7  The court noted that the
274. 674 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
275. Id. at 754 (Joanos & Lawrence, JJ., concurring). See, e.g., Chapter 11, R.
REGuLATING FLA. BAR (law school practice program); Chapter 12, R. REGULATiNG FLA. BAR
(emeritus attorneys pro bono participation program); Chapter 13, R. REGULATING FLA. BAR
(authorized legal aid practitioners rule).
276. 675 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1996).
277. Id. at 107.
278. Rule 4-5.4(a) provides:
(a) Sharing Fees with Nonlawyers. A lawyer or law fim shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate
may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the
lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate or to 1 or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a de-
ceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the
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lawyer "improperly allowed [one of the paralegal firm's owners] to act as his
conduit for giving legal advice by obtaining and relaying, without supervi-
sion, case-specific information to persons whom [the lawyer] never actually
met or consulted." 279 Essentially, this arrangement put the cart before the
horse, with the lawyer working for the paralegal instead of vice versa. The
court also agreed with the referee's finding that the lawyer improperly
shared legal fees with nonlawyers.2 80 Finally, despite the existence of "a
close question," the court found support in the record for the referee's
conclusion that no attorney-client relationship was formed between the
lawyer and the complaining customer.281 The court, however, took care to
"caution lawyers that they should be very careful in placing themselves in
such difficult positions.' ' 2
Other working arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers were
condemned as unethical by the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee.
In Florida Ethics Opinion 95-1, the Committee concluded that a Florida Bar
member who maintains a law practice or otherwise holds himself or herself
out as a lawyer may not ethically enter into a business arrangement with a
nonlawyer to represent claimants in social security disability matters. Fees
claimed by or paid to the bar member for such representation would be
total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased
lawyer,
(3) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disap-
peared lawyer may, in accordance with the provisions of rule 4-1.17, pay to the
estate or other legally authorized representative of that lawyer the agreed upon
purchase price; and
(4) bonuses may be paid to nonlawyer employees based on their extraordi-
nary efforts on a particular case or over a specified time period, provided that the
payment in not based on the generation of clients or business and is not calcu-
lated as a percentage of legal fees received by the lawyer or law firm.
RPC 4-5.4(a) (1987).
279. Beach, 675 So. 2d at 109.
280. Rule 4-5.5(b) provides that a lawyer shall not "assist a person who is not a member
of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unlicensed practice of law." RPC
4-5.5(b) (1987).
281. Beach, 675 So. 2d at 109. The conclusion that the lawyer did not have an attorney-
client relationship with the customer was important, because it had been alleged that the
lawyer represented conflicting interests. The referee cited the following factors in concluding
that an attorney-client relationship had not been established: The customer specifically sought
assistance from the paralegal rather than the lawyer; the customer entered into contract with
the paralegal, not the lawyer; the contract specifically disclaimed representation by the lawyer;
and the customer never met the lawyer but dealt exclusively with the paralegal. Id.
282. Id.
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considered legal fees, and thus this type of arrangement violates rule 4-5.4,
which prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer.
283
Similarly, in Florida Ethics Opinion 95-2 the Committee criticized a
lawyer's proposed involvement with a corporation that represents clients in
securities arbitration matters. The plan presented to the committee called for
the corporation to somehow obtain clients and pay the inquiring attorney to
represent those clients in negotiation and arbitration (if necessary). The
corporation would pay the attorney in the form of a retainer and a percentage
of the company's contingent fee. The Professional Ethics Committee
pointed to problems concerning conflicts of interest, solicitation, fee-
splitting, and assisting the unauthorized practice of law.
In the more traditional vein of lawyers' relationships with nonlawyers
was Florida Bar v. Burkich-Burrell.284 The lawyer represented her husband
in a claim arising from an auto accident. The client-husband's response to
interrogatories failed to disclose a prior accident and related medical
treatment, of which the lawyer-wife had personal knowledge. 2s5 When
charged with misrepresentation, the lawyer defended by asserting that the
interrogatory answers had been prepared by her paralegal and that she had
not reviewed them. Rejecting this defense, the supreme court stated that "an
attorney has a duty to review a client's sworn answers to interrogatories for
correctness, even when the answers have been prepared by the client and a
paralegal.
'1 6
Even when an attorney merely shares space with a nonlawyer, the
attorney must be careful to adhere to the guidelines set out in Florida Ethics
Opinion 88-15. Failing to do so could result in the attorney being held
ethically responsible for the nonlawyer's actions, as happened in Florida
Bar v. Flowers.
77
D. Marketing Activities of Lawyers
Rules regulating marketing activities by lawyers and law firms have
changed greatly over the years, but one thing has remained constant: in-
person solicitation of prospective clients with whom the lawyer has no prior
professional relationship is strictly prohibited.28 Following the tragic crash
283. See supra note 278.
284. 659 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1995).
285. Id. at 1083.
286. Id. at 1084.
287. See discussion supra p. 234.
288. Rule 4-7.4(a) provides:
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of a ValuJet airplane in the Florida Everglades, The Florida Bar asked the
supreme court to impose emergency suspensions on two lawyers who were
accused of engaging in prohibited solicitation of victims' family members.
Although the court declined to suspend the lawyers, it enjoined the lawyers
from any further contact with family or friends of the crash victims as well
as from entering into employment agreements regarding the crash.289
Additionally, the court appointed a senior judge to scrutinize, in light of
Chandris,29° any ValuJet crash employment agreements already entered into
by either of the lawyers.
On the advertising side, the supreme court amended several rules
affecting how lawyers may market themselves through direct mail communi-
cations and ads in the public media. Three changes were made to rules
governing the filing of lawyer ads for review by the Florida Bar's Standing
Committee on Advertising:29' lawyers who advertise via direct mail are no
longer required to file with the bar the names and addresses of persons to
whom direct mail letters are sent;292 a more specific definition was provided
for "public services announcements," which can be exempt from the filing
and review requirement; 293 lawyers who fail to timely submit their ads for
(a) Solicitation. A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional rela-
tionship, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing
so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. A lawyer shall not permit employees or agents
of the lawyer to solicit in the lawyer's behalf. A lawyer shall not enter into an
agreement for, charge, or collect a fee for professional employment obtained in
violation of this rule. The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by tele-
phone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication directed to a specific
recipient and includes any written form of communication directed to a specific
recipient and not meeting the requirements of subdivision (b) of this rule.
RPC 4-7.4(a) (1987).
The long-standing, bright line rule against in-person solicitation could be in jeopardy. In
1993 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a rule barring Florida certified public
accountants from in-person solicitation of accounting business. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761 (1993). Although the Edenfield court clearly distinguished lawyers from accountants, a
federal judge in the Northern District of Georgia recently relied on Edenfield in striking down
the State Bar of Georgia's ethics rule proscribing in-person solicitation of prospective clients.
See Falanga v. State Bar of Georgia, No. l:95-cv-2160-GET (N.D. Ga. Jul. 18, 1996).
289. See Florida Bar v. Perez, 676 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1996); Florida Bar v. Hernandez, 676
So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1996).
290. See supra pp. 260-69.
291. See generally RPC 4-7.5.
292. Florida Bar re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 658 So. 2d 930,
943 (Fla. 1995) (amending RPC 4-7.4(b)(2)(B)).
293. Id. at 945.
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review as required are now subject to a "late fee" of $250 per ad rather than
the usual rate of $50 per ad.294
One notable change was made to the substantive rules governing lawyer
advertising. A new rule provides that all required disclosure statements295
must appear in each language used in the particular ad.296
Although a lawyer's marketing efforts are usually aimed at acquiring
new clients, ethics issues can arise when lawyers leave firms and attempt to
take existing firm clients with them. In Smith v. Bateman Graham, P.A.,297 a
lawyer who was leaving a firm mailed letters urging certain firm clients to
come with him to his new practice. Attempting to stop what it viewed as
improper solicitation, the firm sought to enjoin the lawyer from further
contacts with firm clients on the ground that the lawyer had violated the
ethics rules governing direct mail communications to prospective clients.
298
The circuit court entered the injunction. On appeal, the first district dis-
solved the injunction on the grounds that the firm lacked standing to seek
private enforcement of a bar ethics rule.299 Without addressing the merits of
the firm's allegations, the court held that violation of the RPC or of a
294. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 677 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1996)
(amending RPC 4-7.5(d)(4)).
295. The Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that certain disclosure statements or
information appear in various lawyer advertisements. For example, many ads must include
these sentences: "The hiring of a lawyer is an important decision that should not be based
solely on advertisements. Before you decide, ask us to send you free written information
about our qualifications and experience." RPC 4-7.2(d). Also, the first sentence of all direct
mail communications concerning a specific matter must be: "If you have already retained a
lawyer for this matter, please disregard this letter." RPC 4-7.4(b)(2)(G).
296. Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, 677 So. 2d 272, 283 (Fla. 1996)
(adding RPC 4-7.2(r)).
297. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D947 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1996).
298. The firm alleged that the letters violated subdivision (b)(1)(B) of rule 4-7.4, which
provides:
(b) Written Communication.
(1) A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on the lawyer's
behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm or partner, an associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a written communication to
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if:
() the written communication concerns a specific matter and the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the person to whom the communication is
directed is represented by a lawyer in the matter[.]
RPC 4-7.4(b)(1)(B) (1987).
299. Smith, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D947.
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Professional Ethics Committee advisory opinions does not provide an
adequate basis for instituting a private cause of action.300
VI. THE LAWYER AS A FLORIDA BAR MEMBER
Lawyers move in and out of various roles during their practice, but their
role as a member of The Florida Bar remains constant. Membership in the
bar carries with it a number of duties as spelled out in the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Lawyers who fail to fulfill these ethical obligations,
especially when their actions cause harm to clients or others, face discipli-
nary sanctions ranging from admonishment to disbarment.301
One of the most common allegations appearing in grievance complaints
filed with Florida Bar is that a lawyer neglected the client or the client's
case. In Florida Bar v. Rolle, 30 2 a lawyer with serious problems in these
areas received a ninety-one day suspension from the practice of law.
Similarly, in Florida Bar v. Morrison,303 a lawyer who neglected client
matters and who failed to timely respond to investigative inquiries from the
bar304 was suspended for twelve months and thereafter until required
restitution was made to an affected client.30 5 Another case in which restitu-
tion was ordered in connection with a disciplinary suspension was Florida
Bar v. Schramm.306 Here, a lawyer neglected client matters and made false
statements to a court in connection with a motion to disqualify a judge.
300. Id. at D948. The firm argued that the supreme court's decision in Chandris sup-
ported its position. See discussion supra pp. 260-69. The First District Court of Appeal
disagreed, but nevertheless certified the following question to the supreme court as a question
of great public importance:
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW ESTABLISHED IN CHANDRIS, S.A. V.
YANAKAKIS, DOES A PRIVATE PARTY HAVE STANDING TO SEEK AN
INJUNCTION BASED UPON AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE RULES
REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR?
Smith, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D948 (citations omitted).
301. See generally Chapter 3, R. REGULATING FLA. BAR (addressing "Rules of Disci-
pline").
302. 661 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1995).
303. 669 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1996).
304. Rule 4-8.4(g) provides that a lawyer shall not "fail to respond, in writing, to any
inquiry by a disciplinary agency when such agency is conducting an investigation into the
lawyer's conduct." RPC 4-8.4(g) (1987).
305. Morrison, 669 So. 2d at 1042.
306. 668 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1996).
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Other lawyers had disciplinary problems because they made misrepre-
sentations to courts or while under oath. In Florida Bar v. Inglis,3°7 a lawyer
was found guilty of, among other things, incompetent representation and
lying under oath. This lawyer was subsequently disbarred.08 The misrepre-
sentations at issue in Florida Bar v. Walker3°9 included both overt false
statements and omissions. The supreme court rejected the lawyer's defense
that confidentiality obligations precluded him from disclosing information in
order to correct the misleading impressions under which both the bar and a
third party were operating, stating that "[a]n attorney cannot hide behind
attorney-client privilege in order to mislead with impunity." 310 Moreover,
the court noted that the attorney-client confidentiality rule contains excep-
tions permitting the necessary disclosures. 31' A thirty-day suspension was
imposed.312
False statements filed with the court in a probate matter netted the
lawyer a three-year suspension in Florida Bar v. Segal.313  This case is
especially interesting because the lawyer attempted to resign from the bar by
sending a "resignation" letter to the clerk of the supreme court shortly before
the disciplinary hearing on sanctions. The lawyer's resignation letter, of
course, was not accepted by the court. In its opinion, the supreme court
reminded Florida lawyers that the only method of resignation available to
lawyers who are the subjects of pending grievance complaints is a
"disciplinary resignation" in compliance with rule 3-7.12.f 6
307. 660 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1995).
308. Id. at 701.
309. 672 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1996).
310. Id. at 23.
311. Id. Rule 4-1.6 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Consent Required to Reveal Information. A lawyer shall not reveal in-
formation relating to representation of a client except as stated in subdivisions
(b), (c), and (d), unless the client consents after disclosure to the client.
(c) When Lawyer May Reveal Information. A lawyer may reveal such in-
formation to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
i4i to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's rep-
resentation of the client; or
(5) to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.
RPC 4-1.6 (a), (c)(4)-(5) (1987).
312. Walker, 672 So. 2d at 23.
313. 663 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1995).
314. Id. at 621.
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False statements to a court and other deceitful conduct helped earn
disbarment for a lawyer in Florida Bar v. Maynard.315 In addition to the
various misrepresentations, the lawyer violated conflict of interest rules by
improperly engaging in business transactions with clients.
316
A related form of conflict of interest led to a thirty-day suspension in
Florida Bar v. Marke.317 In this case, the attorney allowed his personal
interest-which grew out of a business transaction with clients-to affect his
representation of clients in related matters. Over time, the lawyer had
represented a married couple in forming a corporation and in personal
matters. The lawyer prepared an agreement for immediate sale of the
corporation, as well as an employment contract between the husband-client
and the company (under its new ownership). Later, the lawyer assisted the
new owner of the corporation in drafting a letter terminating employment of
the husband-client. After formally terminating his professional relationship
with the original clients (husband and wife), the lawyer then represented the
corporation in disputes arising over agreements that the lawyer had prepared
and opposed the original clients in their claims for unemployment compen-
sation.3
18
Lawyers who engage in criminal conduct can expect to receive discipli-
nary sanctions. This happened to several lawyers in 1996. Disbarment was
imposed in cases including Florida Bar v. Bustamante319 and Florida Bar v.
Kushner.320 Disbarment without leave to reapply for ten years was imposed
315. 672 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1996).
316. Rule 4-1.8(a) provides:
(a) Business Transactions With or Acquiring Interest Adverse to Client. A
lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly ac-
quire an ownership, possessory, security, or other pecuniary interest adverse to a
client, except a lien granted by law to secure a lawyer's fee or expenses, unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing
to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of inde-
pendent counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
RPC 4-1.8(a) (1987).
317. 669 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 1996).
318. Id. at 248-49. Other cases in which a lawyer's business transactions with clients led
to disciplinary problems included Florida Bar v. Sofo. See discussion supra pp. 236-41, and
Florida Bar v. Clement. See discussion infra p. 277.
319. 662 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1995).
320. 666 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1996).
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in Florida Bar v. Lechtner,321 a case arising out of the "Operation Court-
broom" judicial corruption investigation in Dade County.
Other noteworthy cases related to a lawyer's role as bar member
included Florida Bar v. Clement,322 in which the supreme court addressed a
lawyer's contention that the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
precluded the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in his case. The court
concluded that, while the ADA does apply to The Florida Bar, it does not
necessarily bar the Supreme Court of Florida from imposing disciplinary
sanctions on a bar member with a disability. A case-by-case analysis of the
disabled person and the jobs or benefits he or she seeks is required. 3
Florida Bar v. Poe324 was interesting because of the supreme court's deci-
sion not to discipline the lawyer. The lawyer had been sanctioned by a
bankruptcy court, and the bar instituted grievance proceedings against him.
The supreme court stated that not every court-imposed sanction is the result
of an ethical violation.3 s In a concurrence filed in Landry v. State,326 a
criminal case, two justices of the Supreme Court of Florida called for
increased imposition of professional discipline against lawyers and judges
whose lack of sufficient competence causes harm to the judicial system (e.g,
through incompetence that results in costly delays in the rendering of
justice).
Finally, it was clear that persistence does not always pay. In Florida
Bar v. McAtee, 327 a lawyer who continued to practice law despite being
suspended from practice by the supreme court was disbarred. A lawyer who
persisted in practicing after being disbarred was ordered permanently
disbarred in Florida Bar v. Neely.328
321. 666 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1996).
322. 662 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1995).
323. Id. at 700.
324. 662 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1995).
325. The supreme court stated:
[wle disagree with the Bar's claim that because [the lawyer] was sanctioned in
federal bankruptcy court he must have violated the Bar's disciplinary rules. The
sanction is minor [the lawyer] and [the lawyer's client] must pay [the client's
ex-wife]'s fees and costs in defending against the petition. Courts commonly
award fees and costs in actions arising from a dissolution of marriage [footnote
omitted], but this does not mean that the other party is automatically guilty of
committing ethical violations.
Id. at 704.
326. 666 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1995) (Wells, J., concurring).
327. 674 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1996).
328. 675 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 1996).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Florida lawyers fill many roles as they engage in their daily practice of
law. Lawyers act as advocates, fiduciaries, officers of the court, and
businesspersons, all within the framework of membership in The Florida
Bar. It is imperative that lawyers be aware of the specific ethical obligations
that they assume when they step into each of these roles. Failure to under-
stand and honor these professional responsibilities can lead to disciplinary
exposure and malpractice liability. This article has summarized important
1996 professional responsibility developments that may affect lawyers as
their carry out their diverse duties in an ever-changing legal landscape.
